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THEORY DEVELOPMENT
What’s in a face? Making sense of tangible information systems in terms of 
Peircean semiotics
Paul Beynon-Davies
Cardiff Business School, Cardiff university, Cardiff, uK
ABSTRACT
Within this paper, we utilise a delimited area of philosophy to help make sense of a delimited 
area of design science as it pertains to a class of contemporary information systems. The 
philosophy is taken from that of Charles Sanders Peirce; the design science is directed at the 
construction of visual devices in that area known as visual management. The utilisation of such 
devices within their wider visual management systems we take to be instances of what we refer 
to as tangible information systems. Tangible information systems use tangible artefacts, such 
as whiteboards and magnetic tokens, to accomplish information. We particularly use Peircean 
semiotics to analyse the use of tangible emoticons articulated upon performance boards within 
a large-scale manufacturing facility. We infer from our analysis of these informative artefacts that 
certain integrated aspects of Peircean philosophy offers an alternative way of framing notions 
of a proper design science, design theory, and design artefact for the discipline of information 
systems.
1. Introduction
Within this paper, we utilise a delimited area of philoso-
phy to help make sense of a delimited area of design sci-
ence as it pertains to a class of contemporary information 
systems. The philosophy is taken from that of Charles 
Sanders Peirce (Houser, 1998; Houser & Kloesel, 1992); 
the design science (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004) 
is directed at the construction of visual devices in the 
area known as visual management (Galsworth, 2005). 
The utilisation of such devices within their wider visual 
management systems we take to be instances of what we 
refer to as tangible information systems (Beynon-Davies 
& Lederman, 2017). Tangible information systems use 
tangible artefacts, such as whiteboards and magnetic 
tokens, to accomplish information. Such systems, as 
we shall show, are still much evident in and important 
to contemporary and diverse work settings. They also 
have many points of similarity with digital information 
systems.
In previous published research (Beynon-Davies, 
2013), we used the case of human emotive facial expres-
sion as useful material for grounding a consideration of 
the philosophy of information (Floridi, 2011). The phi-
losophy of information critically examines the concept 
of information and its consequences. The background 
significance of human emotive facial expression clearly 
underlies the “information” associated with the con-
temporary artefact of the emoticon. The emoticon is 
typically taken to be an iconic representation of certain 
common human facial expressions, many of which are 
taken to signify emotional state. But, as we shall see, 
emoticons are used for other than affective purposes in 
many settings.
For this reason, we take certain inter-linked elements 
from Peirce’s philosophy (Atkin, 2016) to help make bet-
ter sense of the emoticon as an informative artefact. From 
his metaphysics, we describe elements of his universal 
categories which ground his conception of a sign. From 
his semiotics, we re-examine Peirce’s triadic conception 
of a sign. Signs for Peirce (or more precisely the process 
of sign-use or semiosis) are central to all human inquiry. 
From his pragmatism, we examine his contention that 
the meaning and truth of signs can only be judged in 
terms of the consequences they make to action. This con-
tention is an essential underpinning of his approach, not 
only to his semiotics but also to his epistemology.
Within the current paper, we consider a class of con-
temporary information systems employed in diverse set-
tings such as production and healthcare which employ 
the articulation of tangible artefacts (such as dry-erase 
whiteboards and magnetic tokens) for the purposes of 
coordinating work. These systems are taken primarily 
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from the literature on so-called visual management 
(Galsworth, 2005), which generally seeks to promote the 
use of so-called visual devices within the visual work-
place (Grief, 1991). The use of the term visual here is 
somewhat misleading as the artefacts used within the 
visual workplace are not just visual they are also haptic/
tactile and sometimes kinaesthetic.
The articulation of artefacts such as whiteboards 
and magnetic tokens for informative purposes within 
the domain of visual management echoes some of the 
intentions expressed in the cognate areas of tangible 
computing (Dourish, 2004), tangible user interfaces 
(Ishii, 2008), tangible (embodied) interaction (Baskinger 
& Gross, 2010), pervasive computing (Satyanarayanan, 
2001), the internet of things (Atzori, Iera, & Morabito, 
2010), and ubiquitous computing (Weiser, 1991). The 
literature cited (which is representative of a larger body 
of work) suggests that the design of our interaction with 
digital computing and communications systems will 
gradually need to change to accommodate an increased 
focus on the “tangible”. The term “tangible” tends to be 
used in areas such as tangible interaction to highlight 
the distinct affordances of interfaces built with physical 
objects as compared to those built with digital objects. 
The applications of tangible artefacts within tangible 
computing applications have been primarily in areas 
such as learning and play, problem-solving, informa-
tion visualisation and entertainment. There are a small 
number of applications which focus on planning but 
little which highlight the usefulness of the tangible in 
coordinating group or collaborative work. This appears 
to mirror a gap in other information disciplines, where 
interestingly, the manipulation of tangible artefacts used 
for informative purposes is little discussed in the infor-
mation systems literature. For such reasons, we refer to 
physical artefacts used for informative purposes (such 
as magnetic tokens) as tangible informative artefacts and 
propose the use of the term tangible information system 
to denote the systems within which such artefacts are 
used.
The emoticons used within visual management are 
a significant example of what we mean by a tangible 
informative artefact. As we shall see, as a physical arte-
fact an emoticon comprises some iconic representation 
of a human facial expression impressed typically upon a 
magnetic token. These physical tokens are used in many 
different types of tangible information system within set-
tings as diverse as production, healthcare and higher 
education. However, just like many tangible artefacts, the 
role of such artefacts as signs for the purposes of “visual 
management” is relatively unclear. We wish to suggest 
that understanding tangible artefacts such as emoticons 
in terms of a Peircean metaphysics, semiotics and prag-
matics is critical to developing better design theory for 
the visual devices central to visual management. We also 
want to argue that a Peircean perspective offers much 
to information systems more generally, particularly as 
it concerns design science (Hevner et al., 2004), design 
theory (Gregor, 2006) and design artefacts (Gregor & 
Jones, 2007) relevant to this discipline.
The paper takes the following form. First, we con-
sider the architectonic nature of Peirce’s philosophy 
and demonstrate this by describing the essence and 
inter-connectedness of some important work from his 
metaphysics, his pragmatism and his semiotics. This 
leads us to consider the domain of human emotive facial 
expression which forms the backdrop for an informative 
artefact found in many contemporary settings: the emoti-
con. We consider some of the general uses of emoticons 
but then focus upon the contemporary ways in which 
these artefacts are exploited within visual management. 
Our description of visual management, which follows, 
is meant to make the case for considering the systems 
which arise from this approach to operations man-
agement as tangible information systems. We ground 
this consideration in the use of certain visual devices 
in many settings within one large-scale UK manufac-
turing organisation, that of the Royal Mint. The author 
is in the process of conducting the second-phase of a 
study of tangible information systems with this organi-
sation. The focus of the current paper is upon the visual 
devices of so-called performance boards. We also narrow 
our attention to that solely involved with the use of a 
limited range of physical emoticons upon such boards. 
Our analysis of these physical tokens, using elements 
from the philosophy of Peirce, allows us to question 
not only their basis as signs, but more importantly the 
purpose they are put to within their overarching work 
systems. This suggests to us the importance of seeing 
visual management as an attempt to manage the semi-
otics of the workplace. We conclude with some potential 
wider inferences from this insight, namely that Peirce’s 
philosophy offers a fruitful way of re-conceptualising 
both the idea of information and the associated concept 
of an information system. Information, we suggest, is an 
accomplishment only evident within and through the 
coupling of three sign-action-events. This suggests that 
an information system must be seen not as a substantive 
system but as an emergent phenomenon. Our re-con-
ceptualisation of information also suggests the need for 
different ways of thinking about the nature of “design” 
(Hevner et al., 2004) in relation to information systems, 
both tangible and digital.
2. The philosophy of Peirce
Bertrand Russell (1959) saw Charles Sanders Peirce 
as one of the most important philosophers of the later 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. “Beyond doubt 
[…] he was one of the most original minds of the later 
nineteenth century, and certainly the greatest American 
thinker ever” (p. 276). His vast amount of work makes 
contributions to areas as diverse as mathematics, logic, 
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physics, computer science, ethics, linguistics, psychol-
ogy, and the philosophy of science, to name but a few. 
However, the main problem with the work of Peirce is 
that elements from his philosophy are taken and explored 
by various disciplines in a rather piecemeal way and this 
runs rather counter to Peirce’s original intention. This is 
equally true of many “information” disciplines, such as 
information systems, information management, infor-
mation science and computer science.
Peirce’s conception of the sign has been much referred 
to within information systems as a discipline, as well 
as in cognate disciplines. Mingers and Wilcocks (2014) 
develop an integrative semiotic framework for informa-
tion systems based upon a Peircean conception of the 
sign and use it particularly to promote the theoretical 
and methodical orientation of critical realism. Stamper, 
Liu, Hafkamp, and Ades (2000) uses Peirce’s semiotics 
primarily to illustrate the relationship between signs 
and organisational norms (organisational semiotics). 
Liu and Li (2015) build upon Stamper’s notion of an 
organisational semiotics and demonstrate its applica-
tion to business informatics. Liu and Tan (2014) apply 
the perspective of organisational semiotics to digital 
visualisation. Price and Shanks (2005) use the distinc-
tions provided by Peirce in his analysis of the sign to 
clarify essential differences between data and informa-
tion. Within computer science, a Peircean notion of the 
sign informs Desouza’s (2005) semiotic approach to the 
design of human-computer interaction. In the cognate 
area of information science, Huang and Chuang (2009) 
use Peirce’s taxonomy of signs to analyse the phenomena 
of social tagging, while Friedman and Thellefsen (2011) 
use the same taxonomy to classify knowledge for bibli-
ometric purposes.
Peirce’s work is also frequently cited within informa-
tion systems in relation to founding the philosophy of 
pragmatism. Some of the key principles of pragmatism 
are that human concepts are defined by their conse-
quences, truth is embodied in practical outcome and 
learning is controlled inquiry, in which rational thought 
is interspersed with action (Bacon, 2012). Baskerville 
and Myers (2004) see action research as fundamentally 
a paradigm for information systems investigation based 
in pragmatism. Goldkuhl (2006) sees pragmatism as 
the essential underpinnings of design science research 
within information systems. Ågerfalk (2010) describes 
more broadly the importance of pragmatism as offering 
a unique philosophical orientation for information sys-
tems as a discipline.
However, within this literature, which treats Peirce’s 
semiotics or his pragmatism somewhat as reference 
discipline for information systems, information sci-
ence or information management (Keen, 1980), little 
attempt is made to explore his philosophy beyond its 
surface elements. For instance, in terms of his doctrine 
of signs, most authors tend to restrict their account 
to the familiar triad of elements (see below) and use 
it primarily in opposition to the dyadic nature of the 
sign employed within Saussurian linguistics (Raber & 
Budd, 2003). Likewise, those authors who see relevance 
in pragmatism tend to utilise a much broader notion 
of pragmatism than Peirce himself would probably be 
happy with.
Within this section, we want to refocus on Peirce’s 
concept of the sign but argue that other aspects of his 
philosophy help illuminate an important and neglected 
aspect of this thinking within the information disciplines 
– namely, the nature of a sign as a necessary accom-
plishment through semiosis. This notion of the sign as 
dynamic process rather than static structure we believe 
is a potentially useful foundation for establishing some 
important principles for the design of informative arte-
facts, ranging from visual devices to electronic records.
Peirce referred to his philosophy as architectonic. By 
this, he meant that he saw each element of his philosophy 
as being inherently inter-related. Thus, for instance, his 
meta-physics forms an essential ground upon which he 
builds his theory of signs and this theory of signs in turn 
is seen to be a necessary ground for building his concep-
tions of logic and its application (Atkin, 2016). Pierce has 
also been portrayed as a “scientific” philosopher in the 
sense that he was very much interested in the practical 
effect of philosophy. This is evident in the ways in which 
his pragmatism, the idea that any conceptions should 
be judged in terms of their practical bearing, pervades 
many aspects of his philosophy.
We do not have space within this paper to do justice 
to an entire architectonic view of Peirce’s philosophy. 
While acknowledging the limitations of our approach we 
take the familiar route of focusing upon Peirce’s concep-
tion of a sign. However, we try to show more clearly how 
his semiotics is built from his metaphysics and in turn 
how this conception of semiotics interacts with his prag-
matism. In doing this, we attempt to show that signs as 
central elements within the Peircean architectonic offer a 
much more sophisticated accounting of some important 
concepts to the information systems discipline (such as 
that of information and of an information system) than 
is portrayed in extant literature.
Metaphysics is that branch of philosophy that deals 
with the first principles of things. Pierce developed the 
foundation for his metaphysics upon three universal 
categories which he called firstness, secondness, and 
thirdness. Firstness corresponds to undifferentiated 
qualitative experience or sensation. “The First is that 
whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything 
nor lying behind anything” (Houser & Kloesel, 1992, 
p. 248). Secondness involves the relation of a first to a 
second. “The Second is that which is what it is by force 
of something to which it is second” (Houser & Kloesel, 
1992, p. 248). Secondness corresponds to the association 
between phenomena. For instance, the ability of some 
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its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to 
its object in which it stands itself to the same Object. 
(Houser, 1998, pp. 272–273)
I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by 
something else, called its Object, and so determines an 
effect upon a person, which effect I call its Interpretant, 
that the latter is thereby immediately determined by the 
former. (Houser, 1998, p. 478)
The terms he uses for the component elements of the 
sign clearly differ in these three definitions. However, 
the essential elements themselves remain consistent 
throughout almost 30 years of exposition. A sign is 
clearly triadic and as we have seen the triad relates to 
the fundamental elements of his metaphysics. Peirce 
proposed that a sign is a threefold relation, consisting 
of the representamen, the object and the interpretant. 
The representamen is the signifier, sign-vehicle or rep-
resentation. The object is the signified or referent; that 
which is represented. The interpretant is the concept or 
meaning of the symbol formed through some process 
of interpretation.
The traditional relational representation of the com-
ponent elements of the Peircean sign (see Figure 1(a)) 
tends to suggest that the sign is a separable triad. Better 
visualisations of the Peircean sign (see Figure 1(b) and 
(c)) illustrate the way in which the sign only exists within 
the triad or through the accomplishment of the triad. 
In other words, the sign is not in any one component 
element in isolation. Nor is it in all three together as a 
“structure”. Instead, the sign emerges in the mutual cou-
pling of all three component elements within the pro-
cess or accomplishment of semiosis. This means that a 
sign is not static but dynamic and is both shaped by its 
user and shapes the user. “…men and words reciprocally 
educate each other; each increase of a man’s information 
involves and is involved by, a corresponding increase of 
a word’s information” (Houser & Kloesel, 1992, p. 54). 
Indeed, for Peirce the human self is a continuous process 
of sign-action or sign-events. “When we think then, we 
ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a sign” 
(Houser & Kloesel, 1992, p. 38).
Since the interpretant of a sign is also a sign and 
this interpretant is a sign to a further interpretant, and 
actor to relate one thing to another or to differentiate 
one thing from another relies upon its ability to per-
ceive similarities and differences between phenomena. 
Finally, thirdness involves the relation of a second to 
a third. Thirdness corresponds to mediated relations 
involving at least three things. “The Third is that which 
is what it is owing to things between which it mediates 
and which it brings into relation to each other” (Houser 
& Kloesel, 1992, p. 248). If the commonality between two 
things is itself regarded as a thing, then we have a case 
of thirdness. Hence, the ability of some actor to classify 
or categorise things and provide a token to denote such 
categorisation relies upon thirdness.
Firstness, secondness, and thirdness, as pillars of his 
metaphysics, pervade Peirce’s conception of sensation, 
perception, and cognition, and through this his notion 
of a sign. Consider a simple example of this. Humans can 
sense through their sight organ light in the wavelength 
range 620–750 nano-metres. This is firstness (sensation). 
Such sensation can be used to distinguish this form of 
light from another form of light in a different range of 
the visible spectrum, perhaps 490–450 nano-metres. 
This is secondness (perception). Finally, both forms of 
light may be classified as colours and tokens used to 
denote one perceivable colour from another, such as red 
and green. This is thirdness (cognition).
Peirce preferred to denote his theory or doctrine of 
signs in the singular as semeiotic, rather than in the plu-
ral as semiotics. Just like logic was for Peirce the science 
of the necessary conditions for the attainment of truth, 
semeiotic is that science concerned with the general 
conditions of signs being signs. Hence, central to his 
doctrine of signs is his conception of the sign itself, for 
which he provided many different definitions through-
out his life. Three of these are cited below:
A sign has, as such, three references: 1st, it is a sign to 
some thought which interprets it; 2nd, it is a sign for 
some object to which in that thought it is equivalent; 
3rd, it is a sign, in some respect or quality. (Houser & 
Kloesel, 1992, p. 38)
A Sign or Representamen, is a First which stands in 
such genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its 
Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called 
(A) (B) (C)
Figure 1. the triadic nature of a sign.
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1992, p. 226). If the relation is one of secondness then 
the sign is an index. An index denotes its object by vir-
tue of connection between the representamen and its 
object. “An Index is a sign which refers to the Object 
that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that 
Object” (Houser, 1998, p. 291). However, this connec-
tion is irrespective of any interpretation or thought. If 
the relation is one of thirdness then the interpretamen 
is a symbol. Symbols are arbitrary signs or signs that 
rely upon convention. “A Symbol is a sign which refers 
to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually 
an association of general ideas” (Houser, 1998, p. 292). 
The meaning of the symbol as sign thus relies on some 
habitual interpretation, some conventional way of think-
ing by an actor or group of actors.
The crucial point is that in the case of symbols, Peirce’s 
semiotics is not only proposed as an account of language 
use; it is proposed as an account of thought or cogni-
tion – because all thought is in signs and all signs are 
in thought. “The only thought … which can be possibly 
cognized is thought in signs. But thought which cannot 
be cognized does not exist. All thought, therefore, must 
necessarily be in signs” (Houser & Kloesel, 1992, p. 24). 
This suggests that signs are not things or structures but 
events or actions. Thus, the colour red, as a sign, relies 
upon “actions” or processes of sensation, perception and 
cognition. Indeed, evolutionary biologists have begun to 
argue that the explosion of the development of colour 
upon our planet relied upon the mutual development of 
the eye as a sense organ amongst organisms. Amongst 
certain mammals, for instance, the development of the 
ability of this sense organ to discern light in the wave-
length range 620–750 nano-metres mutually developed 
with the capacity of plants to signal the “ripeness” of 
their fruits by reflecting light in this range.
But this notion of the sign as dynamic also suggests 
that we can only judge a sign in terms of the conse-
quences arising from the accomplishment of the sign-
event, which will typically comprise further actions. For 
instance, consider our example of a coloured, magnetic 
token again in this light. Typically, the token would be 
denoted as a sign – as something that refers to some 
other thing in some external reality. But, according to 
Peirce, the sign is not in the thing itself (the token) or 
the thing it is meant to refer to (a piece of production 
machinery); nor is it in the conception or thought of the 
thing (the current status of the plant). A sign, such as 
this, is an activity in which a sign-event is accomplished 
by a particular actor in thought (Hoopes, 1991). But all 
sign-events are teleological events, they have purposes or 
consequences. All sign-events are related to the expecta-
tions, conventions or habits of the actor accomplishing 
the sign-event. For instance, a production worker sees 
a red magnetic token on a whiteboard as a sign of the 
failure of some plant because he knows or expects that 
the placement of such a token upon a whiteboard has 
so on, then Pierce establishes semiosis as a potentially 
infinite process. Consider a deliberately simple example, 
but which has a bearing on our central case, and which 
we shall consider at a later point in the paper. Assume 
that we have a small magnetic whiteboard. Upon this 
whiteboard, we can place one round magnetic token. 
This token may be either coloured green or red. As a 
Peircean sign we might unpack this example in the fol-
lowing manner. The representamen correspond to the 
sensed features of the physical artefact – the magnetic 
token. This might comprise the shape of the token, its’ 
position on the whiteboard, or most importantly the col-
our of the token. The object in this case refers to what 
the token of either colour stands for – in this case some 
plant or machinery within a production unit of the Royal 
Mint. The interpretant refers to what a green or red token 
is interpreted as meaning (thought to mean) by one or 
more actors within this setting. In this case, a red token 
might be taken to mean by production workers that a 
plant has failed and is hence inoperable, while a green 
token might be thought of by production workers as 
indicating that the plant referred to is working and hence 
operable. Hence, to provide meaning to the tokens we 
use other signs (red, production worker, plant etc.) which 
in turn rely on a background of further significance.
To break the infinite regress possible in his notion of 
infinite semiosis (Atkin, 2016) Peirce, in his later work, 
introduced some subtle distinctions between immedi-
ate and dynamic objects and immediate, dynamic and 
final interpretants (Nöth, 1990). Objects as perceived, as 
cognised in the sign, are immediate objects. Hence, in 
our example the immediate object might be taken to be 
some general notion of the machinery or plant within a 
production unit. In contrast, the dynamic object is the 
“real” or identifiable object within the production unit 
– the actual piece of plant which exists independently of 
its perception. Similarly, the immediate interpretant is 
the meaning of the sign that actors would be expected to 
understand, while the dynamic interpretant is the effect 
of such meaning on an interpreter. The final interpretant 
is the eventual effect on the interpreter after the process 
of semiosis is complete. Therefore, the presence of a red 
token upon the whiteboard as an immediate interpretant 
would mean for interpreters that some indicated plant 
has failed. The final interpretant in this case would prob-
ably be that workers, as interpreters of this sign, would 
avoid using a certain piece of plant.
In his later work, Peirce related the triadic elements 
of signs to his universal categories in a number of ways. 
One of the most critical, for our purposes, is the relation-
ship of the representamen to its object. If the relationship 
is one of firstness then the sign is an icon. An icon is a 
sign that has a likeness or semblance with its object – 
it shares some perceptible quality or qualities with its 
object. “I call a sign which stands for something merely 
because it resembles it, an Icon” (Houser & Kloesel, 
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that we continually utilise certain unquestioned beliefs, 
prejudices or habits because they facilitate current 
action. However, such beliefs are always open to ques-
tion and may be revised or relinquished at some point 
if they are no longer found useful. Inquiry is therefore a 
continuous process of securing belief (Hookway, 1985). 
Secure beliefs must rely on a community of inquirers 
scrutinising certain beliefs and testing them in relation 
to action. Such scrutiny is initiated by doubt in the cer-
tainty of certain beliefs by a community of inquirers. A 
belief is, therefore, that which one would be prepared 
to act upon, whereas a doubt is a sense of uneasy dis-
satisfaction experienced when acting according to a 
belief which does not result in expected consequences. 
Therefore, inquiry is a matter of securing beliefs which 
are free from doubt. Inquiry does not aim at truth per 
se, but security from doubt.
This seems to suggest that Peirce does not support a 
notion of true belief, which is incorrect (Gallie, 1952). 
It is apparent from his formulation of dynamic objects 
and interpretants discussed earlier that both his prag-
matism and semiotics supports the notion of real things 
whose character is independent of opinions about them. 
He therefore assumes that a process of inquiry can be 
devised in which the truth of certain beliefs can be fixed 
by a community of inquirers. This means that the exist-
ence of real things can be established or “fixated” in a 
continuous and an enacted consensus of beliefs held 
about them. Reality is thus not determined by a commu-
nity of inquirers, reality is that to which the community 
of inquirers is led through inquiry.
3. Human facial emotive expressions and 
emoticons
Mingers and Wilcocks (2014) have proposed that semi-
otics broadly provides a useful theoretical foundation 
for much information systems research. More recently 
(2017) they have attempted to take this further in sug-
gesting a broad framework for conducting semiotic 
research within information systems. In summary, their 
framework involves the following stages: appreciating 
the research situation in semiotic terms, analysing the 
research material using concepts from semiotics, assess-
ing the validity of proposed explanations in terms of 
possible semiotic worlds and bringing about change, if 
necessary, through semiotic processes. Within the next 
few sections, we want to demonstrate aspects of this 
approach in considering a particularly narrow institu-
tional problem, using the lens of a Peircean semiotics.
In terms of appreciating the research situation, in this 
section we want to consider one particularly interest-
ing example of signs which relate to action in a number 
of fascinating ways within and between contemporary 
institutions. We first reconsider our previous account 
of human emotive facial expressions as signs (Beynon-
Davies, 2013). This allows us to appreciate the semiotic 
been undertaken by some other actor with the intended 
purpose of preventing potentially wasteful action being 
taken in relation to such plant, such as trying to operate 
an inoperable machine.
So, for Peirce there is always an inherent linkage 
between signs, inquiry, meaning and truth. Peirce is oft-
quoted in relation to William James’ claim that he was 
founding father of the philosophy of pragmatism (Atkin, 
2016). He first published this approach to inquiry, mean-
ing and truth in the 1870s – particularly in his paper, 
“How to make our ideas clear” (Houser & Kloesel, 1992). 
However, he revised his account several years later spe-
cifically in response to what he saw to be a misconceived 
rendering of his earlier views by the pragmatic philoso-
phers James and Dewey (Gallie, 1952). He renamed his 
account pragmaticism to emphasise such difference. For 
Peirce, his pragmaticism was not a system of philosophy 
but only a method of inquiry, and, as a consequence a 
way of evaluating sign-use.
The fundamental principle of Peircean pragmatism 
or pragmaticism is that for any sign to be meaningful 
it must have practical consequences. “Consider what 
effects that might conceivably have practical bearings 
you conceive the objects of your conception to have. 
Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of 
your conception of the object” (Houser, 1998, p. 346). 
In terms of this maxim, Peirce provides an account of 
meaning and truth. If we do not consider the object 
of our conception to have any practical bearing, then 
it does not have any meaning. Hence, for Peirce this 
pragmatic maxim is a tool for the analysis of meaning. 
It is designed to help us make our signs, concepts and 
consequently our cognition as clear and meaningful as 
possible.
So how do we know whether the transformation of 
some substance constitutes a sign? For Peirce, we can 
apply the pragmatic test of whether the making of such 
difference to the substance, makes a further difference 
in turn (Bateson, 1972). In other words, we must judge 
any potential sign in terms of its consequences, whether 
it has any practical bearing on some situation. For exam-
ple, if we place a magnetic red token on a whiteboard this 
only constitutes an action within a wider sign-event. We 
can only judge the magnetic token as a sign if it com-
municates something to some other actor and by doing 
so causes some difference to the cognition of this actor. 
We might also judge the result of such “communication”, 
in turn, in terms of differences made to the consequent 
behaviour of that actor, perhaps changes to his or her 
work activity.
It is clear from this that the meaning of the coloured 
magnetic token in this situation is bound up with certain 
beliefs held by actors inter-acting with this artefact. For 
Peirce, a belief is a habit of action (Bacon, 2012), which 
implies that to establish the meaning of a belief, we must 
examine the habits it produces, in turn. Peirce maintains 
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as those for happiness, anger and sadness are inherited 
and thus universal across human cultures (see Figure 2 
for the six universal facial expressions).
However, there is a crucial difference between such 
involuntary facial expressions and voluntary facial 
expression. Voluntary facial expression is mediated by 
culture in the sense that people will utilise contextual 
cues to decide on the appropriateness of certain volun-
tary facial expressions. Hence, smiling at a funeral is 
not normally expected, while frowning at a wedding is 
typically sanctioned, at least in most Western societies.
Therefore, human emotive facial expressions are par-
ticularly interesting because in certain situations they are 
indices, whereas in other situations they are symbols. 
Involuntary facial expressions appear to be indices – 
there is an inherent linkage between an emotive state 
and a certain facial expression. This linkage appears to 
be instinctual or inherited. In contrast, voluntary facial 
expressions are clearly symbols. People can make “false” 
or artificial smiles in social situations and the produc-
tion of such facial expressions is learned and relies upon 
convention, expectation or habit.
Human emotive facial expressions clearly form the 
background semiotic for an artefact much used in con-
temporary information systems of various forms – that 
of the emoticon. Emoticon as a term is supposedly a 
combination of the words emotion and icon. This places 
emoticons clearly in the camp of iconic signs. They share 
certain qualities directly with the facial expressions they 
signify. This means that in many cases we do not need 
to think about or interpret the meaning of such signs; 
it is self-evident from the semblance between the sign 
and its object … Or is it? We shall argue later that there 
context for considering the informative artefacts of 
emoticons as signs, particularly in relation to their use 
within the tangible information systems proposed by the 
operations practices of visual management.
We can summarise what we have learnt from a sub-
stantial amount of research on human emotive facial 
expression in the following terms. The set of human 
emotive facial expressions comprise an important 
sign-system (Darwin, 1998). A facial expression results 
from one or more movements of the muscles of the face. 
Facial expressions are a form of nonverbal, embodied 
communication (Mingers, 2001). They involve signs but 
do not involve use of the human vocal tract. They are an 
important means of conveying aspects of intent amongst 
humans in social interaction. The intent communicated 
through such expressions typically concern emotive 
state. Such expressions are typically “about” such emo-
tions as experienced by a person or at least some form 
of emotional intent that this person wishes to express. 
Emotions are mental states. They are conscious men-
tal states that have some limited duration. Such mental 
states are typically involuntary and typically about some-
thing in the world that matters to us (Ekman, 2003).
What is interesting about facial expressions is that 
those involuntary emotional facial expressions con-
trolled by the sub-cortical motor system do not appear 
arbitrary; they do not rely upon convention, expecta-
tion or habit. Up to the mid-twentieth century most 
anthropologists believed that all facial expressions were 
entirely learned and should therefore differ among cul-
tures. Pioneering work by Ekman and others (1971) 
eventually supported Charles Darwin’s (1998) original 
contention that certain emotive facial expressions, such 
Figure 2. the six “universal” human emotive expressions.
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here is developing an iconic relationship between the dif-
ferences we make with our graphic and with the physical 
configuration of the significant changes to the muscula-
ture of the face within involuntary human emotive facial 
expressions. A typical rendering of such emoticons (for 
the six universal expressions) is given in Figure 3, and 
includes both a textual version and an emoji version.
This leads to the further question of what differences 
do emoticons make within the situations in which they 
are used? In other words, why and how do people use 
emoticons within computer-mediated communica-
tion such as email or texting? From the small amount 
of research on this (Derks, Bos, & Grumbkow, 2007; 
Huang, Yen, & Zhang, 2008; Lee, Lee, Bassellier, & Faraj, 
2010; Xu, Cheng, & Xu, 2007), the suggestion is that 
emoticons allow people to increase the information rich-
ness (Lee, 1994) of a message by adding some affective 
(emotional) component or layer to the message. Lee et 
al. (2010), for instance, finds that emoticons are typi-
cally used to reinforce the positive or negative affect of 
a message. Cyr, Head, Larios, and Pan (2009) find that 
web-sites which contain human images expressing facial 
expression are typically seen by their users as being more 
appealing, “warm” and having “social presence”.
For instance, assume we have two simple text mes-
sages and we add a single emoticon to each statement:
•  Thank you so much for your efforts ☺
•  I think you failed me on this occasion ☹
Emoticons in statements such as this are typically 
taken to be merely iconic representation since they 
look like the original facial expressions. But, through 
semiosis, such icons might in turn also be considered 
is actually a confusing semiotic associated with the use 
of these artefacts in many contemporary information 
systems.
There is evidence of emoticons being used as far 
back as the nineteenth century. However, it took until 
the 1970s for these signs to become commonplace. In 
this period, emoticons were produced as ASCII art by 
overprinting characters. In the early 1980s, the familiar 
sequence of characters: -) (smiley face) and :-( (sad face) 
started to be used widely on ARPANET and Usenet, 
leading to an explosion in forms. With the rise of the 
mobile phone and its use for texting the emoticon took 
off in terms of usage, particularly promoting the use of 
visualisations of certain facial expressions rather than 
character strings as sign-vehicles. Upon social media, 
emoticons have become a sub-class of a wider set of pic-
ture characters known as emoji.
Beyond the broad classification we have just used it 
is useful to unpack the emoticon as a sign more directly 
using the semiotics of Peirce. As a material form, we 
need to ask, what material differences can we make 
with an emoticon as a visualisation? Within the sim-
plest of emoticons this is merely the shape of the line 
denoting the mouth. Hence, to create the simplest of 
“happy” emoticons we merely need to draw an upward 
facing mouth, while to create a “sad” face we draw a 
downward facing mouth. To indicate a “neutral” face we 
draw the mouth as a straight horizontal line. To draw a 
fearful emoticon, we turn the line into a circle. To indi-
cate “anger” we use triangles or the shapes “<” and “>” 
as eyes and draw the mouth as a straight, horizontal 
line. Finally, to build a visualisation of “disgust” we use a 
combination of a circle and triangles. What we are doing 
Figure 3. a core set of emoticons (textual and visual).
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS  9
actors do not need to comply with this message. Visual 
signals share a message but there is a consequent expec-
tation of some reaction to the message on the part of the 
actor. Within visual controls the message is built into the 
physical structure of the device itself. This means that 
the use of the device physically constrains action. Finally, 
visual guarantees are physical devices designed to explic-
itly determine appropriate behaviour unequivocally.
In terms of this typology the emoticons utilised 
within the Royal Mint are normally used as visual indi-
cators; sometimes as visual signals. However, for our 
purposes, Galsworth’s typology is limited and sometimes 
introduces confusion. Instead, we find it more useful to 
unpack such visual devices using the greater sophistica-
tion offered through Peircean semiotics. Visual devices 
are comprised of tangible signs. For instance, unlike 
the sequence of characters or visualisations familiar 
within electronic mails, as a component element of a 
visual device, the emoticon is likely to be made up of a 
physical token that can be manipulated by the human 
hand. As such, visual devices as signs form a tangible 
sign-system. We think of visual management systems 
and their associated visual devices as tangible informa-
tion systems. They involve the manipulation of tangible 
artefacts as signs and such signs seek to communicate 
between multiple actors. On the basis of such commu-
nication, coordinated action between multiple actors is 
accomplished.
The inspiration for the term tangible information 
system comes from ideas emerging in the related areas 
of tangible computing, tangible user interfaces and 
tangible (embodied) interaction. Tangible comput-
ing refers to applications in which tangible objects are 
interfaced with computers. A tangible user interface 
(Ishii, 2008) is one in which some physical object(s) 
is coupled through some computation to digital data. 
Manipulating the physical object causes changes to the 
underlying digital data. Correspondingly, the physical 
state of the object, such as its positioning in relation to 
other physical objects within some space, reflects the 
state of the underlying digital data. We see a necessary 
synergy between some of the themes evident in these 
attempts at developing the “tangible” in relation to com-
puter systems and an area which has much influenced 
the design of work systems in areas such as production 
and healthcare – that of visual management.
Our focus within this section is upon a specific 
tangible artefact and its position within its wider tan-
gible information system – a visual device built with 
the express purpose of helping to control performance 
within production units at the Royal Mint. We also want 
to focus upon use of one sign (the emoticon) which 
appears frequently upon such performance boards. We 
want to highlight the semiotic complexity of such signs 
within the work systems of this setting. And through a 
consideration of this case we want to suggest something 
indices in the sense that there is a causal relationship 
between the emotion and the expression (at least the 
universal expression). Thus, in the two messages cited, 
an interpreter can immediately make sense of emoticons 
as vehicles to express whether someone is “happy” or 
“sad” in relation to the context supplied by the message 
itself. However, emoticons are also used in more com-
plex ways to express an affective sub-text to the message. 
For instance, adding a particular emoticon to a message 
can turn it into the opposite of what the statement by 
itself would be seen conventionally to mean or intend. 
In other words, an emoticon can be used to build irony 
into the sign-vehicle of a text or an email.
But emoticons are also used within communication 
to signify arbitrary or conventional concepts. Consider 
a modification to our earlier whiteboard example. Upon 
our whiteboard, we now don’t just place red or green 
magnetic tokens. Instead, we place a green smiley face 
or a red sad face. We clearly use this to indicate we are 
happy or sad, but with what? Unlike in the case of the 
electronic message where the context is relatively clear 
from the use of other signs (namely, the written statement 
as a sign-string) the context in the case of the smiley or 
sad magnetic token is relatively unclear. Within the case 
of the Royal Mint such icons appear frequently in rela-
tion to visual devices. However, the emoticons are not 
typically used to communicate affect – namely, that an 
identifiable production worker is “happy” or “sad” about 
something. Instead, they are frequently used to indicate 
something concerned with the performance of some plant 
or machinery. In such cases, the emoticons are not icons 
or indices; they are being used as symbols. This leads us 
to inquire more clearly into the semiotics of such signs 
and determine more precisely what emoticons as signs 
are used conventionally to do within such work settings.
4. Visual management
To make sense of the use of emoticons in this institution 
we first need to describe something of the artefacts in 
which they are used. Visual management is a set of oper-
ational practices particularly associated with lean opera-
tions in diverse settings such as production, healthcare, 
software development, etc. (Galsworth, 1997). Visual 
management is normally implemented in terms of the 
notion of the visual workplace and the visual workplace 
is typically instantiated through visual devices. Visual 
devices are directed at the control of work in the visual 
workplace; and in such terms visual devices come in 
various forms.
Galsworth (1997) proposes four main types of visual 
device linked to a so-called “ladder of control”. The idea 
is that the use of such devices within the workplace helps 
control the behaviour of workers. Such devices are seen 
to influence, direct, limit or guarantee such behaviour. 
Visual indicators influence behaviour in the sense that 
the device facilitates the sharing of some message, but 
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and are used to visually indicate the state of three signif-
icant things that affect overall plant operation, namely 
the number of baskets available, the number of rectifiers 
available and whether there are any quality issues asso-
ciated with product. If there are 63 out of a possible 63 
baskets available and 40 out of a possible 40 rectifiers 
available, then a smiley face is used – otherwise a sad 
face is used. If there are no quality issues, then a smiley 
face is used; otherwise a sad face is used.
In these two examples, the tangible artefacts are 
clearly used merely as a binary indicator of the success 
or failure of some plant or associated parameter. The 
manipulation or articulation of such an artefact is a 
symbol in Peircean terms. It relies on production work-
ers knowing the appropriate conventions or building 
appropriate habits in relation to putting a “happy” or 
“sad” emoticon upon a designated space within such a 
visual device.
The key question here is why are emoticons used in 
these delimited areas of the board, when other signs 
might be used? In terms of the representamen or form of 
a sign then just a green and red token might be used or a 
tick and a cross in the box. In other words, a single differ-
ence in colour or perhaps graphic is sufficient to indicate 
a binary shift of state to the plant or to the parameters 
described – the interpretant in this case. It is interesting 
in such cases that these differences rely upon a series 
of conventions between representamens and interpre-
tants that transport between different action-contexts. 
Hence, red and green are key differences upon traffic 
lights used around the world to signal “stop” and “go”. 
Such transportable cultural conventions are sometimes 
referred to within semiotics more widely, and sometimes 
confusingly, as codes (Nöth, 1990). The term code was 
originally adopted from information theory (Shannon, 
1949) where it refers to an algorithm for mapping one set 
of symbols into another. Within semiotics more widely 
a code is typically taken as referring to a repertoire of 
of the efficacy of applying the lens of Peircean semiotics 
to design issues associated with such tangible informa-
tion systems.
Consider the visualisation in Figure 4. Performance 
boards such as this are placed in each production unit 
within the Royal Mint. Such visual devices not only log 
past performance in terms of some important produc-
tion metrics, they also indicate what levels are expected 
over a future time-period.
We shall focus on that limited aspect of these boards 
associated with the use of emoticons. A large box placed 
on the left-most extreme of such performance boards 
is reserved for one large magnetic round emoticon. 
This box is also typically labelled with the words plant 
available. In terms of articulation, given actors within a 
production unit can be seen to take two possible actions 
in relation to this tangible sign. An actor may place a 
red “sad” face in the box or an actor may place a green 
“happy” face in the box. In practice, the token is merely 
switched between the happy face on one side of the mag-
netic token and the sad face on the other.
In Peirce’s terms, there are two inter-dependent signs 
evident in this example – the emoticon and the box 
within which it is placed. In other words, the emoticon 
itself does not refer to any object – the emoticon within 
the context of the box labelled plant available provides 
the object (an identifiable piece of plant machinery). But 
what is the interpretant in this case – what thoughts is 
this sign meant to trigger in the minds of production 
workers? Clearly, a large emoticon is typically used to 
signal whether a plant, such as zinc processing or copper 
processing, is available for operation. A green smiley face 
is used to signify that the plant is available, while a red 
sad face is used to signal that the plant is unavailable.
But emoticons are used in other ways upon such per-
formance boards. Consider an element from this visual 
device blown up in Figure 5. Another set of three boxes 
are labelled here generically with the words plant status, 
Figure 4. a performance board.
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“important”, at least in relation to symbols placed on the 
periphery. Hence, it is probably no accident that sym-
bols relating to “quick response” are placed along the 
central axis of performance boards at the Mint. Actors 
within production units are expected to react rapidly to 
the symbols present in this section of the whiteboard.
In relation to the tangible artefacts under focus we 
might also ask why only two emoticons are used (the 
smiley and sad face) and to whom do they relate? In 
other words, it is possible for emoticons to be used on 
visual devices such as this in a much more personal and 
iconic way. For instance, they might be used to indicate 
the “level” of happiness or sadness (in terms of some-
thing such as satisfaction) that a certain managerial actor 
might have with something important to the produc-
tion unit. Hence, an emoticon may signify being “very 
satisfied, satisfied, neutral, dissatisfied or very dissatis-
fied” with some situation by an identifiable actor. In this 
example, a clear linkage is not only made between an 
affective state and a certain actor, there is also a greater 
granularity of affective state signified.
Our experience of visual devices utilised within set-
tings such as the Royal Mint demonstrates that a key 
problem is that such emoticons are used to signify differ-
ent things in different contexts. In certain contexts, there 
is confusion about what the emoticon should mean. In 
some circumstances (such as in aspects of plant status) 
they do express (what Searle (1970) would call an expres-
sive) but the expression is something like the level of 
current satisfaction by the production unit as a whole 
with some aspect of plant performance. In other circum-
stances, such as in the case of plant available they merely 
indicate whether a plant is up and running or not. In 
pretty much all cases, it is unclear who is attempting to 
communicate through such signs and particularly what 
the consequent result of such communication should be.
We need to be clear here that we should be analys-
ing not the sign as a structure but the sign as an action 
or event. The major usefulness of visual devices as 
compared to digital computing displays placed within 
workplaces such as production units relates to both their 
tangibility and their visibility. The emoticons on such 
boards are immediately visible to all production workers 
within the production unit, as are the articulations made 
to the component elements of such devices. As we have 
seen, upon such boards, red sad faces frequently appear, 
signalling that something has gone wrong within the 
operation of key plant. The practical result of the artic-
ulation of such a sign should be that some appropriate 
action is taken to rectify the situation. The “acid test” 
of any sign is therefore the action that results from its 
use. If no difference results from some key difference in 
articulation upon some device, then no communication 
occurs and no action can be taken.
It is interesting that on certain other visual boards 
placed strategically at places within the Royal Mint, 
signs or more accurately a sign-system which is adopted 
across different cultural domains. In such a sense, the 
universal facial expressions, as we have described them, 
act as a “code” which is transported from the realm of 
human, embodied communication into various types of 
dis-embodied artefact, such as the emoticon.
Another example of certain codes imported into the 
use of visual devices concern notions of orientation 
(Kress & Vanleeuwen, 1996). When we view a visual 
device such as a performance board we inherently adopt 
certain “codes” in relation to the placement of symbols 
upon the device. Within European cultures the orienta-
tion of the symbols on a whiteboard, for instance, tends 
to emulate the orientation of symbols on other commu-
nication “devices” with which we are familiar, in terms 
of common conventions, expectations or habits.
Hence, a European will expect to “read” a visual 
device from top to bottom and from left to right. Such 
codes of orientation may further influence our expecta-
tions as to the meaning of symbols upon a visual device. 
For instance, if the device is meant to display events of 
some kind then we might expect symbols relating to 
“past” events to be placed to the left on the board, while 
events relating to the future to be placed to the right 
upon the board. Interestingly, such conventions are not 
particularly evident in the performance boards at the 
Mint, where the current situation is placed leftmost 
while the past plots of performance are placed towards 
the right.
Likewise, if the symbols relate to certain assessments 
of worth then we might expect “good” evaluations to be 
placed towards the top of the board while “poor” eval-
uations are placed towards the bottom of the board. 
In relation to the performance boards at the Mint, it 
is probably no accident that failure and maintenance 
activities are placed at the bottom of such boards, while 
the key metrics of performance are placed at the top.
Finally, we also appear to apply certain conventions of 
centre and periphery to visual devices. Hence, if some-
thing is centred in relation to some delimited area of a 
visual device then the symbol is foregrounded as being 
Figure 5. a delimited area of the performance board.
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historically taken certain actions in response to identi-
fiable situations and that such actions have been proven 
to extend plant availability. What they want from a visual 
device is an appropriate semiotic established where the 
significance of certain situations and associated actions 
is shared amongst production workers.
In design situations with participants from the Royal 
Mint we have started to explore whether emoticons are 
really the most appropriate sign for communicating 
something like plant availability. As hopefully we have 
established in previous sections, the emoticon as a sign 
can be quite confusing, partly because of its iconicity. 
Emoticons as icons for facial expression are probably 
best restricted to communicating various types of affect, 
such as expressing some level of satisfaction or dissat-
isfaction by identifiable actors with designated states 
of some work situation. In such terms, it is important 
that the use of any emoticon should be clearly linked to 
some nominated actor expressing some emotive state. 
Otherwise the interpretamen of this sign is likely to be 
unclear or confusing to actors because of the way in 
which the code of facial expression is transported into 
this domain.
Generalising from this example we think it possible to 
treat the design of visual devices within visual manage-
ment as a “philosophical” enterprise in the Peircean vein. 
The design of the tangible information systems associ-
ated with visual management involves building visual 
devices appropriate for their designated action-contexts. 
Visual management for us particularly involves man-
aging what might be referred to as the semiotics of the 
workplace.
Our work in this area suggests three important things 
to consider in relation to managing this semiotic. We 
clearly need to consider the material form of signs, but 
also how they are articulated upon visual devices. Since 
most of the signs used upon visual devices are symbols 
rather than icons or indices we also need to clearly indi-
cate the communicative conventions associated with 
certain signs and their articulation. In Peircean terms, 
these are habits that relate material forms to thoughts 
and consequent actions. Finally, we need to examine 
the relationship between signs and instrumental action 
within the workplace. The interpretamen of a symbol is 
typically used in such settings upon visual devices not to 
open up further dialogue but as a trigger to one or more 
resultant actions within the workplace.
It is interesting that within the Royal Mint visual 
devices, such as the performance boards we have dis-
cussed, have been designed by management consult-
ants or by workers themselves with little or no explicit 
design theory. Taking lessons from a Peircean semiotic 
we have developed a provisional design theory for visual 
devices and the tangible information systems within 
which they take their place. This design theory consid-
ers their construction in term of three coupled domains 
nothing but green smiley faces generally appear. In 
talking to production workers this is apparently because 
nothing ever is represented as going wrong with the 
production process, which these boards are meant to 
signify. In such situations, the visual devices clearly do 
not make any difference. No differences are apparent in 
the tokens placed upon such boards. And, as a result, no 
difference is made to any action within production units 
by production workers. So where is the “information” 
in this case?
5. Managing the semiotics of the workplace
Taking lessons from Peircean semiotics we must be clear 
within the design of a visual device about three things, 
for each of the elements of the visual device. These three 
things relate to the three component elements of the 
Peircean triad: what is the representatmen, what such a 
sign-vehicle should refer to and how it should be inter-
preted. It is tempting to think that design in such terms 
involves merely the assignment of appropriate types to 
certain tokens in each case. But this tends to reify the 
device as merely an “artefact”. It supports the notion 
that signs such as emoticons or the aggregation of such 
signs within visual devices such as performance boards 
are merely “structures” or “artefacts” to be designed and 
manipulated.
The Peircean conception of a sign as an action-event 
or probably more accurately as a series of inter-linked 
action-events provides for us a more productive concep-
tion of how to do design in relation to a visual element 
such as an emoticon or a visual device such as a perfor-
mance board. An emoticon placed upon a performance 
board is not a structure it is a sign-event; it brings into 
being an action-space through which actors accomplish 
“information”. The key consequence of this is that the 
“effectiveness” of the sign and sign-system must and can 
only be assessed in terms of the relationship of the sign 
and sign-system to the action it engenders, whether this 
be another level of semiosis or eventual instrumental 
action. Hence, the design of signs for use within the 
workplace must not only consider the material form of 
the sign and what articulation of this sign is intended 
to communicate – it must also specify the actions that 
result from such communication.
For instance, there is a level of concern currently 
expressed by certain stakeholders within the Royal Mint 
about the use of visual devices such as the performance 
boards we have described within plant management. One 
concrete part of such concern is that expressed about the 
usefulness of the current semiotic accomplished through 
the emoticons we have described. As we have seen, the 
availability of plant is only indicated through these signs 
currently as being in one of two states – available or not 
available. In practice, plant managers and engineers want 
to know when a plant is perhaps running but likely to fail 
in the future. They also know that certain workers have 
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includes those systems reliant on digital computing and 
communications technology. Applying a Peircean semi-
otic, we have argued in previous sections for treating 
information as an accomplishment through sign-use or 
semiosis. We have also suggested the usefulness of think-
ing about information as emerging from the coupling 
of three domains of action that relate to such sign-use. 
This further suggests the need to reconsider the nature 
of design science and design theories in relation to infor-
mation systems as “artefacts”.
The idea of a design science, distinct from a natural 
or a social science, was first proposed in Herbert Simon’s 
Sciences of the artificial (1996). For Simon, such a sci-
ence is directed at the production of artificial entities 
(artefacts) rather than something that occurs naturally. 
Hevner and others (2004) have packaged this perspec-
tive more recently as a design science and like Simon 
believe that such a science should be a “tough, analytic, 
partly formalizable, partly empirical, teachable doctrine” 
(Simon, 1996). A number of the information systems 
academy have proposed a conception of design science 
which is focused both upon building theories and con-
structing artefacts for design and action (Gregor, 2006; 
Gregor & Hevner, 2013; Hevner et al., 2004). According 
to Gregor and Hevner (2013), design science research 
within this tradition “involves the construction of a wide 
range of socio-technical artefacts such as decision sup-
port systems, modelling tools, governance strategies, 
methods for IS evaluation and IS change interventions”. 
But such design artefacts should also be situated within 
of sign-action-events (illustrated in Figure 6). The first 
domain consists of the articulation of structures which 
act as sign-vehicles. The second domain relates certain 
acts of articulation with one or more acts of communica-
tion. As such this domain is particularly concerned with 
the relationship between a sign-vehicle and its object. 
The third domain relates certain acts of communication 
with some designated act or acts of coordinated activity. 
As such, this domain relates a sign-vehicle with its final 
interpretant, which at least in terms of visual devices is 
directed at the eventual work behaviour to which the 
sign-vehicle is directed.
Figure 7, for instance, illustrates one sequence of 
sign-action-events consisting of the articulation of cer-
tain emoticons in the Mint, what these signs currently 
and conventionally are meant to communicate and 
what work activity is engendered through such sign-
use. Through the coupling of such actions, the repre-
sentamen, interpretant and object of the sign in this case 
are accomplished or unified.
6. Information systems from a Peircean 
perspective
As mentioned previously, we take the tangible informa-
tion systems discussed in this paper to be instances of 
the wider class of information systems. As such, within 
the current section we tentatively extrapolate some of 
the analysis we have made of tangible information sys-
tems to the wider class of information systems, which 
Figure 6. three domains of sign-action-events.
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suggest that the proper locus for information systems 
should be expanded to that of IT-reliant work systems.
Perhaps not surprisingly, in positioning itself in rela-
tion to this locus debate, much of extant design science 
research has tended to frame a notion of a design science 
concentrated on the IT artefact (Junglas et al., 2011). 
More recently, Lee, Thomas, and Baskerville (2015) have 
argued that this is limiting and that the proper artefact to 
consider in relation to our particular discipline is what 
they refer to as the information system artefact. For Lee 
et al., the information system artefact can be unpacked 
into a separate “technology” artefact, “information” 
artefact and “social” artefact. This appears to echo some 
of the developing consensus surrounding the framing 
of an information system as a socio-technical artefact 
or more precisely a socio-technical system (Baxter & 
Sommerville, 2011).
Adapting a socio-technical view means thinking of an 
information system as a substantive system made up of 
the inter-leaving of some system of information technol-
ogy with some system of work. The suggested relevance 
of viewing information systems through a socio-tech-
nical lens has occurred repeatedly within the discipline 
of Information systems, ever since the landmark paper 
of Bostrom and Heinen (1977). For instance, the work 
of Enid Mumford (2006), which has influenced many 
research studies within IS, explicitly adopts a socio-tech-
nical viewpoint. The equally influential body of work by 
Peter Checkland (1999) implicitly adopts an orienting 
appropriate design theories. Gregor (2006) suggests that 
design theory can be seen as one of the five fundamental 
types of theory relevant to the discipline of Information 
systems. Design theories focus on how to do something: 
they provide explicit prescriptions on how to develop 
design artefacts.
It should be evident from the discussion above that 
critical to all three inter-related notions of design science, 
design theory and design artefact is that of the artificial 
“object” – the artefact – produced as the outcome of any 
design practice which hopefully also serves to instantiate 
some design theory (Gregor & Jones, 2007). This debate 
about the position of the artefact within design science 
reflects and interacts with a parallel debate about the 
centrality of the information technology (IT) artefact as 
locus for the discipline of information systems (Hassan, 
2011). This debate has revolved particularly around the 
positioning of “information technology” in relation to 
an “information system” as the proper locus for the dis-
cipline. Benbasat and Zmud (2003), for instance, have 
argued for a locus situated in the centrality of the IT 
artefact. However, Orlikowski and Iacono (2001) argue 
that there is an unfortunate lack of engagement with 
the notion of the IT artefact in the Information systems 
literature. Where such engagement is evident Nevo et al. 
(2009) maintain that information systems as a discipline 
takes a special interest in those information technolo-
gies that enable communication, collaboration and deci-
sion-making. This has led some, such as Alter (2003), to 
Figure 7. Visualising signs in action.
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analysis and design. To demonstrate this, consider one 
conception central to the sociomaterial – that of entan-
glement. Entanglement, or more accurately quantum 
entanglement, is a concept borrowed from theoretical 
physics (Barad, 2007; Vedral, 2010; Von Baeyer, 2003) 
and refers to that strange phenomenon which occurs 
when the measurement of the state of something, such 
as an elementary particle, correlates with an instanta-
neous change of state to another thing with which the 
particle originally interacted. As Mutch (2013) argues, 
from definitions of the sociomaterial, such as the one 
provided above, it is currently difficult to conceptual-
ise the “state changes” that must constitute entangle-
ment of material and human agency (Leonardi, 2011). 
In contrast, viewing information systems through the 
lens of Peircean philosophy seems to us a more pro-
ductive way in which deficiencies in ways of “weaving 
the fabric of IT with organisation” (Zammuto, Griffith, 
Majchrzak, Dougherty, & Faraj, 2007) can be addressed. 
For instance, in terms of the analysis provided in this 
paper any notion of entanglement (we prefer the term 
coupling) must refer to the ways in which the sign as 
an inter-leaved cycle of action-events is constituted in 
the continuous accomplishment of organising. The sign 
is clearly an enacted whole. However, as hopefully we 
have demonstrated, any sign can and must be analysed 
in terms of separable “fields” of enactment to be made 
sense of in practice.
Therefore, our experience of inquiring into tangible 
information systems in practice raises certain doubts 
about ways in which information systems are concep-
tualised not only as socio-technical or sociomaterial 
“artefacts” but also about ways of doing design science 
research in relation to the information system artefact. 
We wish to argue that the conception of an information 
system as a substantive system is particularly difficult to 
apply productively within practical situations of design, 
such as the ones we have considered in relation to visual 
management. This, we feel, is because a conception of an 
information system as a socio-technical or indeed as a 
sociomaterial system fails to adequately account for the 
emergent nature of information itself as an accomplish-
ment enacted through semiosis.
Consider the very simple example of the articula-
tion of emoticons upon performance boards within the 
Royal Mint. Where is the information system in this 
example? The information system is clearly not in the 
“technology”. Indeed, our example (at least as far as the 
coordination of work through magnetic tokens is con-
cerned) deliberately does not involve any information 
technology, at least as conventionally conceived. The 
information system is also not in the work or coordina-
tion system nor does it solely lie in the communication 
system, as we have portrayed it. This leads us to suggest 
that assigning the concept of an information system to 
the category of one or more of these substantive systems, 
distinction between soft (human) systems and hard 
(technical) systems. More recently, Alter’s call (2003) for 
the IS academy to focus on issues relating to IT-enabled 
work systems clearly employs a socio-technical lens.
Orlikowski and Iacono (2001) argued some time 
ago that much research conducted by the information 
systems academy does not actually study information 
systems. Instead, it tends to take one of two polar posi-
tions. One method of interpretation, characteristic of 
technological determinism (Benbasat & Zmud, 2003), 
tends to portray innovations in information technology 
as a critical force or driver shaping innovations in social 
systems. Another method of interpretation, character-
istic of the social construction of technology (Bijker, 
2009), tends to portray information technologies as 
fundamentally shaped by social forces. More recently, 
Orlikowski (2005, 2006, 2007) and others (Introna & 
Hayes, 2011; Leonardi & Barley, 2008, 2010; Orlikowski 
& Iacono, 2001; Wagner, Newell, & Piccoli, 2010) have 
tried to resurrect and re-constitute the nature of technol-
ogy (particularly information technology) within both 
organisation science and the information disciplines by 
arguing for the sociomaterial nature of organisational 
practice. Orlikowski (2007), for instance, argues that
… materiality is integral to organising … the social and 
the material are constitutively entangled in everyday life. 
A position of constitutive entanglement does not privi-
lege either humans or technology (in one-way interac-
tions), nor does it link them through a form of mutual 
reciprocation. (in two-way interactions)
Defining the sociomaterial as the constitutive entan-
glement between technology and humans implies that 
organisational practices are not social, technological or 
indeed socio-technical practices; they are sociomaterial 
practices.
We mentioned that Peirce saw his philosophy as 
architectonic, meaning that he felt that his account of 
semiotics and pragmatism, amongst other areas, should 
be treated as a unified whole. His pragmatic maxim was 
thus for Peirce merely a method for inquiring into the 
meaning of signs. Meaning (at least as far as symbols 
is concerned) is a belief in the practical bearings of 
a particular sign, which is always open to doubt and 
hence revision. Within the current section, we have 
inquired into the conception of an information system 
as a socio-technical system and expressed some doubt 
as to the practical bearings of such a conception. We 
have similar levels of doubt in the belief that information 
systems are best conceived of as sociomaterial systems. 
We mention just one such doubt here.
The concept of the sociomaterial is an intellectually 
seductive one for the information systems academy but 
an extremely difficult conceptualisation to pin down in 
terms of the pragmatic maxim of Peirce. In other words, 
it is particularly unclear what difference conceiving of 
information systems as sociomaterial systems makes 
to processes of inquiry such as information systems 
16   P. BEYNON-DAVIES
general principle that these three layers of action can be 
analysed separately but in practice are coupled. The idea 
of coupling is taken from the work of Dourish (2004), 
where he defines it as “the degree of coordination of 
two elements, and how that coordination is maintained”. 
We further propose that this idea of coupling, at least as 
it applies to tangible information systems, is useful in 
unpacking the relationships between actions of articu-
lation, communication and coordination. The coupling 
between the articulation and communication domains 
refers to the ways in which actors use the manipulation 
of sign-vehicles with the intention of affording commu-
nication between themselves and others. The state of the 
articulation domain at any one time may serve to com-
municate collective intentions, which, in turn, affords 
the coordination of work.
Hence, an information system is best considered a 
phenomenon that emerges from the coupling of not two 
domains of system, but three domains of sign-action: an 
articulation domain, a communication domain and a 
coordination domain. Phrased in Lee et al.’s (2015) terms 
an information system is not an aggregation of technol-
ogy, information and processes, it is an accomplishment 
achieved through inter-related or coupled action with 
signs enacted by ensembles of humans, machines and 
artefacts within such domains. An information system 
is a system of action with and through signs. This leads 
us to suggest the need for a design science, as well as 
design theories and design artefacts which do justice to 
this action-oriented view (Baskerville, 2008; Baskerville, 
Lyytinen, Sambamurthy, & Straub, 2011).
7. Conclusion
We have attempted within this paper to focus upon 
an aspect of Peircean semiotics which is frequently 
under-emphasised, particularly in literatures which 
import the triadic nature of the sign into some way of 
explaining communicative patterns. The sign, for Peirce, 
is not a structure, it is a process. A sign emerges through 
the accomplishment of actors within semiosis. A sign 
is thus an event, or more precisely a coupled triad of 
action-events. Just like Mingers and Wilcocks (2017), we 
feel that this way of making sense of signs and their posi-
tioning within ways of organising offers much poten-
tial for resolving certain difficulties with the enduring 
problematic of information technology and organisation 
(Zammuto et al., 2007).
Our intention in this paper has not been to supply a 
comprehensive account of Peircean philosophy and an 
analysis of its value to information systems, as a disci-
pline. Instead, it has been to demonstrate how certain 
integrated aspects of Peircean philosophy suggest an 
alternative orientation to notions of design theory appro-
priate to a certain class of information system. In line 
with Peirce’s general orientation that philosophy should 
be both evaluated by and utilised within practical action, 
which each contribute to a way of organising, is to com-
mit what Ryle (1949) refers to as a category mistake. 
A category mistake is an ontological error. It involves 
instantiating something as belonging to a category or 
class when this thing belongs to a different category or 
class. Ryle introduces this idea through anecdotes, such 
as the following. A visitor on making his first visit to 
Oxford and seeing the college buildings and the library, 
asks of his guide, “but where is the university?” The 
visitor here makes the category mistake of assuming a 
university is equivalent merely to physical infrastructure 
rather than to institutional infrastructure. Likewise, Ryle 
argues, the idea of treating the mind as an object made 
of an immaterial substance commits a category mistake. 
For him there is no “ghost in the machine” – the mind 
cannot be separated from acts of the body, and more pre-
cisely, a critical organ of the body, the brain. We believe 
that within information systems as a discipline there is a 
marked tendency to commit a similar category mistake, 
or perhaps two related category mistakes in relation to 
an information system as a concept.
First, much of the extant literature tends to equate 
an information system necessarily with the application 
of digital computing and communications technology. 
We have attempted to demonstrate within this paper 
that the concept of an information system must instan-
tiate a different category altogether if it is to satisfacto-
rily explain the efficacy of a large range of non-digitised 
systems that enable the effective coordination of work 
in diverse and contemporary settings. This suggests that 
we need to treat an information system as a meta-con-
cept detached from any technologies, such as the visual 
devices of visual management systems.
Second, Ryle started an approach to the concept of 
mind which regards it as an emergent system reliant 
upon certain physical systems, most importantly the 
central nervous system. In a similar manner, a close 
analysis of examples such as the one considered in the 
current paper suggests that the concept of an informa-
tion system is better conceived of not as a substantive 
phenomenon but as an emergent phenomenon. An 
information system can be observed to emerge from 
the coupled inter-action of articulation, communica-
tion and coordination activities, all working together. 
The term information system properly stands for certain 
properties that emerge from what we have referred to in 
previous work as the continuous enactment of signifi-
cance (Beynon-Davies, 2011). Such properties emerge 
from the inter-action between the articulation of mate-
rial artefacts, the communication of intent and content 
that such entails and the coordination of the work of 
multiple actors that results from such articulation and 
communication.
This re-framing of the information system “artefact” 
as an emergent phenomenon rather than a substantive 
system has one important consequence. We take it as a 
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of institutional practice. This analysis allows us to clearly 
delimit what emoticons do and do not do within this 
workplace. As such, we are able to think through more 
clearly issues relating to the intent of signs used within 
visual devices. We would suggest that through this lens 
we can start developing appropriate design theory in 
terms of better managing the semiotics of the workplace.
We have focused our critique of the notion of artefact 
within design science by considering the limitations of 
viewing tangible information systems as socio-techni-
cal systems. However, there are evident problems also 
with the way in which the idea of the socio-technical 
(and even the sociomaterial) is typically applied in rela-
tion to the association between the articulation of IT 
artefacts (such as enterprise resource planning systems 
or patient administration systems) and organisational 
work, which illustrate the potential wider application of 
the philosophical orientation to research described here. 
For instance, a recent paper (Volkoff & Strong, 2013) 
speculates about the organisation-level affordances of 
IT usage for collaboration in organisations. This implies 
that in some way manipulation of an IT artefact has 
effects within the area of work, such as improving or 
supporting group collaboration. The theorisation pro-
vided in the current paper, based within the philoso-
phy of Peirce, helps better explain how such support 
is enacted, but not as a straightforward direct linkage 
(sometimes portrayed as a linkage of causality) between 
technology and its application to work.
Clearly an IT artefact (such as a hospital patient 
records system or a hospital email system) affords 
actors certain actions such as being able to make and 
view electronic patient records or write and view emails. 
However, the affordances of the IT artefact apply purely 
within the domain of the IT artefact itself and involve 
solely the articulation of data structures as sign-vehi-
cles. The concept of affordance, as originally conceived 
(Gibson, 1977), cannot explain how articulations per-
formed in relation to the IT artefact are used as cues or 
triggers to further action by actors in another context or 
domain – the domain of coordinated work. For instance, 
it cannot explain how the action of actor A in making 
a record through an artefact such as a hospital patient 
administration system triggers a consequent change to 
the action of actor B who detects that electronic record 
on the patient administration system, and then performs 
an action in a completely different place (such as at a 
hospital bed) and at a different time (such as one work-
ing shift later).
Hence, information systems as a discipline needs bet-
ter ways of accounting for and unpacking this wider con-
ception of its’ key locus - that of an information system. 
Another way of putting this is that we agree with Alter 
(2003) that in considering the design of information sys-
tems for areas such as production, manufacturing and 
healthcare we should focus upon wider systems rather 
we have attempted an analysis of visual management 
through certain inter-linked aspects of his philosophy.
As we have seen, Lee et al. (2015) frames the infor-
mation system artefact in terms of three related types of 
artefact which they refer to as the “technology” artefact, 
“information” artefact and “social” artefact. We suggest 
a reframing of an information system not as an aggrega-
tion of artefacts but as a coupled system of socio-com-
municative-technical action. This refocuses attention 
from an interpretive framing of an information system to 
a pragmatic framing of an information system (Ågerfalk, 
2010; Goldkuhl, 2012). For us, an information system 
must constitute an ensemble of actors taking coordi-
nated, communicative and articulative action (Beynon-
Davies, 2010), that includes not only machines such as 
computers but also artefacts such as data structures.
Our conception of the coupling of socio-commu-
nicative-technical action has some synergies both with 
the frameworks proposed by Dietz (2006) and that 
of Stamper (2001). Dietz does not appear to build his 
framework for enterprise ontology directly upon semi-
otics although his forma/informa/performa distinction 
seems to have many elements of similarity with our artic-
ulation/communication/coordination cycle. Stamper’s 
conception of an organisational semiotics owes much 
to the work of Charles Morris (1946), who directly uses 
Peircean semiotics but diverges from it in substantial 
ways. Within organisational semiotics signs are analysed 
in terms of four related layers, including empirics, syn-
tactics, semantics and pragmatics. Empirics consider the 
physical and technical nature of signs whereas pragmat-
ics considers the social constraints and consequences of 
sign-use. This layered conception of the sign is useful in 
emphasising the complexity of signs and their use but 
tends to suggest a structural or relational view of the 
sign and a consequential phased method for conducting 
semiotic analyses.
In contrast, we have spent some time explaining how 
a Peircean conception of the sign demands an action-ori-
ented or process view of the sign. The consequence of 
this for us is that to operate analysis and design as a form 
of Peircean inquiry, the researcher or designer must 
engage with the way in which three domains of sign-
action-event are necessarily coupled through semiosis 
in any way of organising. As we have tried to demon-
strate in our process of abduction between case and 
theorisation, any true semiotic inquiry as far as Peirce 
is concerned must acknowledge the unified nature of 
signs as accomplishments achieved through semiosis. 
Hence, to properly analyse and/or design signs the focus 
of the researcher or designer must continuously move 
back and forth between how signs are articulated, what 
they conventionally are intended to communicate and 
in what way they achieve coordination.
Within this paper, we have concentrated on the semi-
otics of emoticons as exemplified in one situated instance 
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than purely digital computing technologies. He suggests 
a focus upon work systems. We would suggest a focus on 
ways of organising and how such ways are constituted 
through Peircean semiotics. Unlike some of the sugges-
tions evident in the literature on the sociomateriality of 
information systems, we maintain that the relationship 
between the articulation of some artefact and the com-
munication it enacts is always subject to temporality; as 
is the relationship between some act of communication 
and the coordinated activity it enacts. Hence, there is a 
necessary temporal lag between one actor articulating a 
magnetic token, another actor interpreting the meaning 
of such articulation, and yet another actor performing 
some activity. The lag may be seconds, minutes, hours, 
days, weeks or potentially even months, depending on 
the work setting. We have also been interested in those 
situations in which the sign-action-events are enacted 
not by a single actor but by multiple actors. The conse-
quences of situated aspects of semiosis therefore must 
be unravelled not in terms of simple sequences of sign-
action-event but in terms of patterns of organising con-
stituted through communities of inquiry.
Within this paper, we have used our way of thinking 
about the semiotics of the workplace to help unpack why 
visual management works or does not work as tangible 
information systems. It is our intention to pursue and 
evaluate this method for unravelling the emergent nature 
of information systems in further studies. We are in the 
early stages of applying and refining this design the-
ory within further engagement with organisations. For 
instance, as intimated in the paper, we are exploring the 
design of visual devices within the Royal Mint in areas 
such as preventing plant failure. This work will hopefully 
further explore the ways in which signs not only serve 
to build institutional ontology (about what “things” are 
seen to exist) but also assumptions about both positive 
power (rights, permissions, authorisations etc.) and neg-
ative power (obligations, duties, responsibilities) associ-
ated with such “things” (Beynon-Davies, 2016).
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